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On	January	25,	2008,	in	Toronto,	Ontario,	
the	Faculty	of	Law,	University	of	Toronto		
(U	of	T)	and	the	National	Abortion	
Federation	(NAF)	co-hosted	an	
interdisciplinary	symposium	to	celebrate	
the	20-year	anniversary	of	Regina v. 
Morgentaler,	the	Supreme	Court	case	in	
which	the	criminal	law	on	abortion	in	
Canada	was	held	unconstitutional.
The	symposium	brought	together	more	
than	100	participants,	from	legal	scholars,	
abortion	providers	and	journalists	
to	representatives	from	government	
and	women’s	advocacy	organizations.	
Examining	abortion	from	a	variety	of	
perspectives,	participants	addressed	the	
significance	of	the	event	and	the	difference	
the	R. v. Morgentaler judgment	has	since	
made	to	women,	providers	and	the	politics	
of	abortion	in	Canada.
This	reader,	prepared	in	collaboration	with	
the	Women’s	Health	Research	Institute,	is	
a	compilation	of	the	day’s	presentations	at	
this	commemorative	legal	conference.
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I	am	honoured	to	have	been	invited	to	be	
a	panelist	in	such	distinguished	company	
at	this	important	event.	I	am	particularly	
attracted	to	the	invitation	in	the	title	of	
the	Symposium	to	reflect	upon	the	1988	
decision	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	
in	R. v. Morgentaler.26	In	reflecting	upon	
the	case,	its	significance	and	legacy,	I	want	
to	talk	about	the	importance	of	history,	
the	contradictory	nature	of	law	and	the	
enduring	importance	of	ideology.
I	take	this	liberty	of	insisting	upon	the	
importance	of	historical	experience	and	
perspective	and	I	do	so	because	I	am	of	the	
view	that	it	is	due	entirely	to	my	historical,	
as	opposed	to	current,	engagement	with	the	
critically	important	issues	of	abortion	and	
law	that	I	have	been	honoured	with	this	
invitation.	
Reflections on the Importance  
of History 
I	was	reminded	recently	of	the	importance	
of	history	and	how	quickly	something	
“becomes”	history	by	my	own	lapse	in	
precision:	I	asked	my	research	assistant	
to	pull	the	Supreme	Court’s	Morgentaler	
decision	for	me,	which	she	dutifully	did:	
the	Supreme	Court’s	R v Morgentaler	
1993	decision.27	Of	course,	this	was	my	
fault—I	had	not	been	clear	enough.	But	
it	then	occurred	to	me	that	my	smart	
feminist	research	assistant	may	not	have	
known	there	had	been	other,	indeed,	a	
few	other,	Morgentaler	decisions.28	To	my	
feminist	colleagues	in	the	academy	I	ask,	
are	we	confident	that	we	are	teaching	
26	 [1988]	1	S.C.R.	30;	[1988]	SCJ	No.	1.
27	 R v. Morgentaler [1993]	3	S.C.R.	463
28	 e.g.	Morgentaler	v	The	Queen	(1975)	30	C.R.N.S	
209.
this	generation	of	law	students	about	this	
decision	and	its	importance?	One	has	
to	hope	that	they	are	not	relying	on	the	
mainstream	media	for	their	introduction—
or	misinformation—about	the	Morgentaler	
case?	Clearly	this	Symposium	is	an	
important	event,	intended	as	it	is	to	re-
insert	abortion	and	reproductive	rights	on	
our	collective	agendae.
I	was	speaking	last	week	about	today’s	
Symposium	to	a	friend	who	graduated	
from	Law	School	in	1989.	She	said	her	time	
at	law	school	was	marked	by	preoccupation	
with	the	issue	of	abortion	law	and	that	
for	her	and	women	law	students	of	her	
generation,	the	1988	Morgentaler	decision	
was	a	defining	moment	of	victory.	I	
remember	it	so	well,	and	so	personally.
On	the	early	evening	of	January	28,	1988,	
almost	two	weeks	after	our	daughter’s	first	
birthday	celebration,	we	had	bundled	her	
into	her	stroller	and	joined	hundreds	of	
kindred	spirits	in	a	spontaneous	rally	in	
front	of	the	then	still	standing	Morgentaler	
clinic	on	Harbord	Street	in	Toronto	to	
celebrate	the	decision	of	the	Supreme	Court	
historic	decision.	Women,	abortion	and	
law	had	become	the	issue	around	which	
I	politicized	when	I	embraced	feminism	
in	my	twenties,	to	the	great	chagrin	of	
my	Irish	Roman	Catholic	father	and	my	
French	Roman	Catholic	mother	who	was	a	
maternity	ward	nurse.	For	the	next	twenty	
years	my	political	and	academic	work	
focused	on	abortion.	As	a	law	student	in	
a	seminar	on	Advanced	Administrative	
Law,	I	tried	to	research	the	processes	
and	practices	of	therapeutic	abortion	
committees	in	Saskatchewan	hospitals.	This	
proved	to	be	difficult	research,	as	it	was	
nigh	unto	impossible	to	find	any	working	
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committees.	Like	many	Canadian	feminists	
of	my	class	and	generation,	I	marched	in	
countless	International	Women’s	Day	and	
pro-choice	demonstrations.	Who	can	forget	
how	cold	our	feet	got	in	those	frosty	March	
8	marches	on	Women’s	Day	before	the	
arrival	of	global	warming?	We	marched	and	
carried	signs	that	demanded	the	state	get	
its	laws	off	our	bodies,	repeal	abortion	law	
and	drop	the	charges,	again	and	again	and	
again.
I	studied	the	legal	history	and	context	of	the	
criminalization	of	English	abortion	law,	the	
genesis	of	the	statutory	prohibition	in	1803,	
the	demise	of	the	relevance	of	quickening	
and	the	ousting	of	the	jury	of	matrons,	and	
the	extension	of	the	criminal	law’s	scope	
over	the	entire	period	of	pregnancy.29	I	
studied	the	issue	of	the	criminal	liability	
of	the	non-pregnant	woman	attempting	
the	self-induce	a	miscarriage	of	a	non-
existing	pregnancy	which	took	me	into	the	
snakes	and	ladders	of	the	law	of	impossible	
attempts.	But,	there	was	not	much	‘action’	
in	the	criminal	cases—one	encountered	
abortion	in	criminal	legal	history	
principally	in	homicide,	where	a	woman	
had	died,	and	her	lover,	friend,	doctor,	
midwife	was	prosecuted	for	willful	murder.
When	I	turned	to	social	history	and	
women’s	history,	I	found	a	different	story.	
Indeed,	it	was	in	the	course	of	this	research	
that	I	learned	my	most	profound	political	
and	intellectual	lessons:	to	appreciate	the	
importance	of	women’s	agency	and	self-
determination,	and	the	ways	in	which	in	
the	abortion	context	they	had	defied	the	
law	and	medical	men:	I	found	the	voices	
of	women	who	said	to	doctors,	“Nonsense,	
doctor,	there	is	no	life	yet…”	and	“Doctor,	I	
do	not	believe	it	is	a	crime.”30
29	 Shelley	Gavigan,	“The	Criminal	Sanction	as	it	
Relates	to	Human	Reproduction”	(1984)	5	J.
30	 see	Shelley	A.M.	Gavigan,	The Abortion Prohibition 
and the Liability of Women: Historical Development 
and Future Prospects (Master	of	Laws	thesis,	
Osgoode	Hall	Law	School,	York	University,	1984)	
at	96-97.	See	also,	Shelley	A.M.	Gavigan,	“‘On	
The	historical	record	of	coercive	and	
restrictive	abortion	law	in	the	Anglo-
Canadian	context	is	filled	with	relatively	
few	criminal	prosecutions	and	far	more	
expression	of	women’s	resistance.	One	
need	think	no	further	in	our	recent	history	
than	of	an	ordinary	young	woman,	Chantal	
Daigle,	thrust	unwillingly	into	the	national	
news	in	1989	when	her	former	boyfriend	
attempted	to	prevent	her	from	terminating	
her	pregnancy—neither	the	first	nor	last	
man	to	attempt	to	do	so,	neither	the	first	
nor	last	man	to	fail	in	the	Canadian	courts.31
During	that	summer,	under	the	watchful	
eyes	of	an	entire	nation,	Daigle	resisted	
her	former	boyfriend,	the	Canadian	anti-
choice	movement,	the	courts,	among	
others.	Daigle	reminded	us	that	“women’s	
individual	and	collective	struggles	for	
choice	and	self-determination	may	have	
been	constrained,	but	have	never	been	
wholly	confined	nor	determined	by	the	
legal	and	judicial	processes.”32
The Contradictory Nature of Law
It	was	also	in	this	work	into	the	social	
and	legal	history	of	abortion	that	I	began	
to	develop	an	understanding	of	the	
contradictory	nature	of	law,	including	
criminal	law,	and	what	I	later	characterized	
as	the	“fragile,	incomplete	and	
contradictory”	nature	of	legal	victories,33	
including	the	decision	we	are	invited	to	
reflect	upon	today.	As	but	one	illustration,	
bringing	on	the	menses’:	The	Criminal	Liability	
of	Women	and	the	Therapeutic	Exception	in	
Canadian	Abortion	Law”	(1986)	1	C.J.W.L.	279.
31	 Daigle v. Tremblay	[1989]	2	S.C.R.	530;	for	
earlier	unsuccessful	‘father’s	rights’	injunction	
applications	in	Canada,	see	Whalley v. Whalley et al 
(1981),	122	D.L.R.	(3d)	717	(B.C.Co.Ct);	Medhurst 
v. Medhurst et al (1984),	9	D.L.R.	252	(Ont.H.Ct.).	
For	a	later	one,	see	Murphy	v.	Dodd	(1999),	63	
D.L.R.	(4th)	515	(Ont.H.Ct.).
32	 Shelley	A.M.	Gavigan,	“Morgentaler	and	Beyond:	
Abortion,	Reproduction	and	the	Courts”	in	
Janine	Brodie,	Shelley	A.M.	Gavigan	and	Jane	
Jenson,	The Politics of Abortion	(Toronto:	Oxford	
University	Press,	1992)	117	at	146.
33	 Ibid.
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the	1969	introduction	of	the	therapeutic	
exception	in	the	Canadian	criminal	
code	had	at	least	one	surely	unintended	
consequence;	in	casting	abortion	as	a	
medical	matter,	the	law	inhibited	husbands	
who	went	to	court—prior	to	1988—to	
attempt	to	prevent	their	wives	from	
terminating	their	pregnancies.34	This	is	one	
small	instance,	in	my	view,	of	the	law	not	
only	mediating	but	inhibiting	patriarchal	
relations.	In	many	ways,	the	legal	history	
of	abortion	taught	me	most	of	what	I	ever	
learned	about	women,	law	and	the	state,	
about	law	and	patriarchal	relations,	and	
law’s	contribution	to	social	change.
But	back	to	the	evening	in	January	
twenty	years	ago—as	we	left	the	rally	on	
Harbord	Street	and	walked	back	to	our	
car,	we	encountered	a	small,	disgruntled,	
venomous	group	of	anti-choice	women.	
Looking	at	the	baby	in	the	stroller,	they	
hurled	an	epithet	at	us,	one	that	embodied	
all	the	contradiction	and	hatefulness	of	
their	self-proclaimed	pro-life	stance:	“Why	
didn’t	you	abort	that	one?”	I	had	never	
doubted	their	commitment	to	life	was	
confined	to	the	invisible	and	unborn,	but	in	
that	moment	I	came	to	appreciate	that	their	
hatred	and	disrespect	for	women	extended	
to	living	and	breathing	children.	
The	historic	Morgentaler	decision	was	
but	the	first	of	many	legal	defeats	their	
movement	would	experience	in	Canadian	
courts.	But,	the	experience	of	the	last	
twenty	years	suggests	their	defeats	at	the	
hands	of	the	law	have	not	been	fatal.	As	I	
have	suggested	elsewhere,	it	takes	more	
than	“feeble	law	reform	and	litigation”	to	
defeat	patriarchal	institutions,	practices	and	
relations.	
I	am	happy	to	leave	close	analysis	of	
the	Supreme	Court	decision	to	the	
Constitutional	scholars.	Suffice	it	to	observe	
that	as	a	feminist	activist	and	veteran	
of	marches,	all-candidates	meetings,	
34	 E.g.	Medhurst,	supra	note	7.
campaigns,	days	of	action,	struggles	to	get	
the	sisters	in	the	early	days	of	National	
Association	of	Women	and	the	Law	to	take	
a	pro-choice	position—I	hope	I	will	be	
indulged	for	saying	simply	that	after	years	
of	struggle—reading	Chief	Justice	Dickson’s	
and	Madam	Justice	Wilson’s	words	made	
one	a	bit	lightheaded:
Forcing a woman, by threat of criminal 
sanction, to carry a foetus to term unless 
she meets certain criteria unrelated to 
her own priorities and aspirations, is a 
profound interference with a woman’s 
body and thus a violation of her security  
of the person.35
Theoretically,	I	take	the	view	that	law	is	a	
social	form	in	and	through	which	social	
relations	are	mediated	and	expressed.	But	
with	respect	to	abortion,	I	look	outside	
the	law	to	civil	society.	I	do	acknowledge	
legal	abortions	tend	to	be	safer	than	illegal	
abortions.	And	so	I	am	not	agnostic	about	
the	efficacy	of	legality	and	its	importance	
as	a	foundation	for	safety	and	access—it	is	
most	assuredly	a	necessary	but	insufficient	
precondition.
In	the	area	of	abortion,	Canadian	women	
have	experienced	many	legal	victories	in	
Canadian	courts,	some	by	the	skin	of	their	
teeth,	some	at	the	hands	of	judges	who	are	
more	grudging	than	others,	with	dissents	
that	give	cause	for	alarm.	
The Importance of Ideology 
It	is	now	axiomatic	to	observe	the	Supreme	
Court’s	1988	decision	resolved	some	
questions	but	left	many	more	dangling—
tantalizing	and	inviting	to	the	opponents	of	
women’s	right	to	choose.	For	instance,	the	
precise	nature	and	expression	of	what	all	
judges	of	the	Supreme	Court	characterized	
as	the	“state’s	interest	in	the	foetus”	
remained	to	be	elaborated	and	tested.	
35	 Morgentaler	(1988),	supra	note	4	at	408.
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Long-time	anti-choice	renegade,	Joe	
Borowski,	had	been	granted	standing	
by	the	Supreme	Court	in	1981	to	bring	
an	action	challenging	the	validity	of	the	
therapeutic	abortion	amendments	to	the	
Criminal	Code	in	the	name	of	foetal	legal	
personhood.36	He	lost	the	foot	race	with	
Morgentaler	to	the	Supreme	Court,	and	by	
the	time	he	reached	the	Court,	the	abortion	
section	of	the	Code	had	been	struck	down,	
and	his	appeal	was	dismissed	as	moot.37
Still,	the	discourse	of	the	‘unborn	child’	
began	to	appear	in	the	judgments,	and	
is	now	ubiquitous,	even	as	the	Courts	
resisted	the	claims	advanced	in	favour	
of	foetal	legal	personhood	and	so-called	
father’s	rights.38	Having	lost	the	legal	fight	
in	the	context	of	criminal	law	and	access	
to	abortion,	anti-choice	advocates	looked	
to	other	legal	forms,	such	as	child	welfare,	
to	advance	their	cause.	In	1996,	they	found	
what	they	surely	believed	to	be	the	poster	
child	for	foetal	rights	in	the	pregnancy	of	
a	poor	pregnant	woman	addicted	to	glue,	
who	had	lost	three	children	to	child	welfare	
apprehension,	and	who	refused	to	stop	and	
refused	treatment.39
The	child	welfare	agency	sought	a	
declaration	that	the	superior	court’s	
inherent	parens	patriae	jurisdiction	over	
children	extended	to	“unborn	children.”	
And	they	lost,	taking	comfort	from	a	
dissent	by	Justice	Major	that	my	Children	
and	the	Law	students	thought	was	right	on.
In	1992,	I	wrote,
The potential cultural and political 
successes of the foetal rights movement… 
lie in its ability to both capture the 
36	 Borowski v. Minister of Justice of Canada and 
Minister of Finance of Canada	(1982),	39	N.R.	331	
(S.C.C.).
37	 Borowski v. Canada	(Attorney	General),	[1989]	1	
S.C.R.	342	(S.C.C).
38	 e.g.	R. v. Sullivan,	[1991]	1	S.C.R.	489;	see also 
Daigle v Tremblay, Murphy v Dodd, supra note	7.
39	 Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest 
Area) v. G. (D.F),	[1997]	3	S.C.R.	925.
imagination and tap the anxiety of people 
who are receptive to the notion that 
pregnant women are capable of extreme 
acts of selfishness and irresponsibility. 
The foetus is presented as helpless and 
vulnerable, the most innocent of innocent 
victims. Again, what is striking is that 
this campaign has been so successful 
without significant support in Canadian 
law for its fundamental underlying 
premise: that the foetus is a person with 
legal rights.40
But,	as	Rosalind	Pollack	Petchesky	argued	
with	prescience	in	the	American	context,41	
the	legalization	of	abortion	contributed	
to	the	ascendance	of	an	aggressive	anti-
abortion	movement,	one	that	has	continued	
to	organize	in	the	churches	and	religious	
schools.	Their	discourse	of	the	unborn	child	
has	become	a	dominant	ideology	of	our	
time.	Their	ability	to	present	all	pregnant	
women	as	risky,	possibly	irresponsible,	
always	potentially	hostile	to	their	own	
pregnancies,	has	in	my	view	become	
pervasive	and	I	believe	socially	shared.	So,	
rather	than	speak	of	maternal	mortality,	
or	of	women’s	inherent	dignity,	of	the	
complexity	of	the	abortion	decision,	never	
not	a	complex	decision,	never	an	easy	
choice,42	or	of	sexual	coercion,	they	assert	
only	a	chorus	of	the	unborn	child	in	a	self-
impregnated	woman.	
40	 Gavigan,	supra	note	8	at	132.
41	 Rosalind	Pollack	Petchesky	Abortion	and	a	
Woman’s	Choice:	The	State,	Sexuality	and	
Reproductive	Freedom	(Boston:	Northeastern	
University	Press,	1985).
42	 See	Wilson	J.	in	Morgentaler	(1988),	supra	note	
2	at	para	242:	The	decision	is	one	that	will	have	
profound	psychological,	economic	and	social	
consequences	for	the	pregnant	woman.	The	
circumstances	giving	rise	to	it	can	be	complex	
and	varied	and	there	may	be,	and	usually	are,	
powerful	considerations	militating	in	opposite	
directions.	It	is	a	decision	that	deeply	reflects	
the	way	the	woman	thinks	about	herself	and	her	
relationship	to	others	and	to	society	at	large.	It	is	
not	just	
33
The	law	is	implicated	in	the	ideology	of	the	
unborn	child,	but	it	seems	to	me	that	some	
of	its	currency	and	legitimacy	derives	from	
its	opposition	to	the	law—as	a	form	that	
needs	to	be	protected,	and	the	law	is	not	
doing	that.	I	take	the	view	that	ideologies	
become	dominant	not	necessarily	through	
law	and	occasionally	in	opposition	to	
law,	but	emergent	as	well	as	dominant	
ideologies	may	nonetheless	be	imported	or	
incorporated	into	law.	When	I	last	wrote	
about	abortion	fifteen	years	ago	(hence	my	
commitment	to	an	historical	perspective	
today),	I	wrote	that	the	strongest	weapon	
in	the	arsenal	of	the	anti-choice	movement	
had	not	yet	proven	to	be	a	legal	one—and	I	
continue	to	hold	that	view.
I	am	mindful	that	the	Symposium’s	
dedicated	organizer,	Dawn	Fowler,	would	
have	liked	me	to	discuss	the	dilemma	of	
the	dearth	of	availability	of	late	trimester	
abortions	in	Canada—and	this	I	have	not	
done.	But	I	do	want	to	make	the	point	that	
ideologues	like	David	Frum43	attempt	to	
cultivate	in	the	national	imagination	that	
late	trimester	abortions	are	a	ubiquitous	
menace,	a	direct	legacy	from	Madam	
Justice	Wilson’s	courageous	reminder	of	the	
limits	of	men	to	be	able	to	respond—‘even	
imaginatively’—to	something	so	out	of	
his	personal	experience.44	It	is	difficult	to	
discern	even	a	kernel	of	truth	in	David	
Frum’s	construction	of	the	crisis–	for	the	
world	is	truly	upside	down	through	his	
lens.	The	image	of	the	scourge	of	late	
trimester	abortion	could	not	be	further	from	
the	truth,	and	yet	it	is	asserted	as	truth.
Increasingly,	I	believe	we	must	situate	
the	struggle	of	Canadian	women	within	
	 a	medical	decision:	it	is	a	profound	social	and	
ethical	one	as	well.	Her	response	to	it	will	be	the	
response	of	the	whole	person.
43	 David	Frum,	“The	Morgentaler	Decision	
Cheapened	the	Worth	of	Human	Life”	http://
network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/
archive/2008/01/21/david-frum-the-morgentaler-
decision-cheapened-the-worth-of-human-life.
aspx.
44	 Wilson	J,	in	Morgentaler	(1988)	supra	note	2.
the	broader	context	of	women	around	the	
world	who	are	struggling	under	adverse	
conditions	to	deal	with	unintended	
pregnancies.	A	recent	study	by	Gilda	
Sedgh	and	her	colleagues,	published	in	
Lancet,45	found	that	48	per	cent	of	all	
abortions	worldwide	were	unsafe	and	
that	97	per	cent	of	all	unsafe	abortions	
were	in	developing	countries—so	many	
of	the	world’s	women	have	access	only	
to	unsafe	abortions,	if	they	have	access	
at	all.	I	am	neither	a	Constitutional	Law	
nor	International	Law	scholar.	Currently	I	
am	interested	in	legal	history	of	criminal	
law,	but	I	know	something	of	the	historic	
struggle	of	women	to	control	their	fertility	
against	the	odds	of	men,	medicine	the	
state,	the	law	and	religion.	Is	it	at	all	
surprising	that	women	have	always	had	
to	resist	and	challenge	their	relegation	to	
social	invisibility	as	moral	agents?	But	
feminists	have	long	known	that	there	are	
no	easy	victories,46	certainly	not	in	the	area	
of	reproductive	health,	and	we	have	the	
expertise	in	this	area,	in	this	room,	starting	
with	the	person	sitting	next	to	me.	
I	do	struggle	with	how	to	engage	with	
the	dominant	ideology	of	the	unborn	
child.	But	there	are	some	lessons	that	can	
be	drawn	from	historical	reflection.	For	
me,	it	is	important	to	remember	the	most	
meaningful	victories,	especially	those	
derived	from	law,	need	to	be	extended	
and	experienced	outside	the	four	corners	
of	the	courtrooms,	and	celebrated	beyond	
feminist	circles,	especially	feminist	legal	
45	 Gilda	Sedgh,	et	al,	“Induced	Abortion:	Estimated	
Rates	and	Trends	Worldwide”	(2007)	370	Lancet	
1338	at	1342	(www.thelancet.com).	Unsafe	
abortions	are	defined	as	“Abortions	done	either	
by	people	lacking	the	necessary	skills	or	in	any	
environment	that	does	not	conform	to	minimum	
or	medical	standards,	or	both.	These	include	
(a)	abortions	in	countries	where	the	law	is	
restrictive	and	(b)	abortions	that	do	not	meet	legal	
requirements	in	countries	where	the	law	is	not	
restrictive”	(at	1339).
46	 Kathleen	McDonnell,	Not An Easy Choice: A 
Feminist Re-Examines Abortion (Toronto:	The	
Women’s	Press,	1984).
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circles.	For	twenty	years	prior,	leading	up	
to	the	Morgentaler	decision,	women	activists	
and	their	allies	made	abortion	a	public,	
political	issue	in	Canada,	starting	with	the	
Abortion	Caravan	in	1969.	Dr.	Morgentaler	
lent	his	name,	his	professional	reputation,	
his	career	and	indeed	his	life	to	the	support	
of	this	important	campaign.	But	it	was	
never	just	about	the	law.	It	was	about	and	
for	Canadian	women.
In	closing,	my	last	thought	is	this—if	
we	acknowledge	the	current	ascendant	
discourse	is	one	of	the	unborn	child,	then	
we	as	feminists	and	supporters	of	choice	
for	women	must	re-insert	the	women	in	the	
social	vernacular,	and	start	again	from	the	
premise	that	the	pregnant	woman	and	the	
unborn	child	speak	with	one	voice,	and	that	
voice	is	hers.
